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callmemadamThe book is described as revisionist (it was written before Roberts’ biography of Napoleon, which I wrote rather a lot about early in 2021). Roberts says that most historians have stated that while Napoleon underrated Wellington before Waterloo, Wellington regarded Napoleon as a military genius. ‘It is these two myths that the present work sets out to dispel, for the truth is far less straightforward and much more interesting.’ ‘We shall see’ that by the time of Waterloo, each general rated the other highly. ‘This is not a joint biography, but rather a study in beliefs and rivalry, propaganda and rancour.’
I see little point in comparisons between their lives such as that they were born in the same year and each had the same number of brothers and sisters. So wot? More to the point is that for each man, Waterloo was the defining moment of their lives and since Wellington outlived Napoleon by many years, he had longer to put his side of the story. They were certainly not equals in terms of power. Once Napoleon had made himself Emperor, he was able to conscript men into la grande armée, virtually mobilising the whole of France. In contrast, Wellington was merely the commander of forces in the Peninsular War and was always answerable to Parliament, where he had many pro-Napoleon enemies among the Whigs. Napoleon claimed that Wellington would be forced to vacate the Peninsula and be rescued by the Royal Navy but this never happened; Napoleon seems not to have appreciated the ‘ulcer’ that the campaign had become and blamed his own generals rather than Wellington’s tactics for the French failure to drive out the British and defeat the Spanish guerrillas. He never went there himself, which could have made all the difference: Wellington said that Napoleon’s presence was ‘worth 40,000 men’.
They were certainly interested in each other. Wellington read Napoleon’s mouthpiece Le Moniteur (he was fluent in French) and Napoleon insisted on seeing all the English newspapers, to glean information. Napoleon dismissed Wellington as a mere ‘sepoy general’ (a reference to his service in India), something which always rankled with Wellington. He snobbishly regarded Napoleon as ‘not a gentleman’ and almost always spelled his name ‘Buonaparte’ rather than ‘Bonaparte’, to emphasise his non-French origins. Napoleon’s great skill, which Wellington admired, was in moving vast armies about very quickly. But for him, war was all about grand strategy and he lacked Wellington’s experience as an infantry commander in the field. Where Napoleon’s approach was dashing and surprising, Wellington was naturally more cautious (and perhaps more careful of the lives of his men). He was brilliant at defence, as in the Lines of Torres Vegas and again at Waterloo, where he used his oft-employed tactic of concealing his troops behind a slope. He was also careful to secure supply lines, something Napoleon failed to do in Russia. Both men were ruthless, with the difference that Napoleon wanted to be another Alexander, whereas Wellington genuinely hated war.
By the time of Waterloo Wellington, unlike Napoleon, had won all his battles. British troops were a minority in the Allied army but well trained, accurate marksmen and said to be more frightened of their NCOs than of the enemy. The Dutch and Flemish troops did themselves no credit but the battle could not have been won without Blücher’s Prussians. Wellington praised Blücher in his Waterloo despatch but never truly gave him enough credit. Napoleon’s plan was always for the big set-piece battle, in which the French would advance in a column. The British practice, as is well known, was the double line of infantrymen firing alternately and the forming of squares to repel cavalry. At Waterloo, Napoleon did not act as swiftly as usual and later blamed his own commander for failing to defeat Blücher completely at Ligny. Each side exaggerated the number of opposing troops.
After Waterloo, the Allies had to decide what to do about Napoleon. Blücher was all for executing him but Wellington opposed this strongly. He also prevented the destruction of monuments to Napoleon in Paris, another thing the Prussians were keen to do. Roberts says that Napoleon’s nemesis was not Wellington but his own decision to invade Russia. That’s not how Napoleon saw it. He had no idea that Wellington had saved his life and blamed him, quite wrongly, for sending him to St Helena, cet affreux rocher. While in exile, he spent his time going over and over the battle of Waterloo (and his listeners seem to have taken down every word eagerly). Everyone was to be blamed except himself and his former praise of Wellington turned to hatred. Wellington’s generalship was criticised; if he’d done the ‘correct’ things Napoleon suggested, he might have lost. Napoleon became so obsessed with his perceived wrongs and so petty-minded that in his will he left a sum of money to a man who had tried to assassinate Wellington.
What of ‘old nosey’, the Duke himself? The Victorians liked to portray him as a modest and self-effacing hero, typically English, but Roberts says he was ‘vain about his lack of vanity’. When you think of the priceless quantities of Napoleana (is there such a word?) at Apsley House (No.1 London, as it used to be called, rather wonderfully) and his country house at Stratfield Saye (gifts and items he bought himself), what are they but spoils of war, the sign of a conquering hero? He continued to praise Napoleon as a soldier while despising him as a man and as he grew older, some of his Waterloo stories became exaggerated.
Military historians have discussed for years and no doubt will continue for many more examining every detail of the campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars. Very interesting for them, I’m sure, but does it really matter? Napoleon was defeated, the Whigs in England discomfited, the map of Europe redrawn again, Britain, as Sellars and Yeatman would have it, Top Nation and France, instead of settling to peaceful times under the Bourbon restoration, spent the rest of the century in a state of almost continuous turmoil. In fact, everything was well set up for the First World War.
After reading this and other books on the subject, I find that although Napoleon is more important historically and was a kind of force of nature, Wellington is actually more interesting psychologically. Just my opinion.
I see little point in comparisons between their lives such as that they were born in the same year and each had the same number of brothers and sisters. So wot? More to the point is that for each man, Waterloo was the defining moment of their lives and since Wellington outlived Napoleon by many years, he had longer to put his side of the story. They were certainly not equals in terms of power. Once Napoleon had made himself Emperor, he was able to conscript men into la grande armée, virtually mobilising the whole of France. In contrast, Wellington was merely the commander of forces in the Peninsular War and was always answerable to Parliament, where he had many pro-Napoleon enemies among the Whigs. Napoleon claimed that Wellington would be forced to vacate the Peninsula and be rescued by the Royal Navy but this never happened; Napoleon seems not to have appreciated the ‘ulcer’ that the campaign had become and blamed his own generals rather than Wellington’s tactics for the French failure to drive out the British and defeat the Spanish guerrillas. He never went there himself, which could have made all the difference: Wellington said that Napoleon’s presence was ‘worth 40,000 men’.
They were certainly interested in each other. Wellington read Napoleon’s mouthpiece Le Moniteur (he was fluent in French) and Napoleon insisted on seeing all the English newspapers, to glean information. Napoleon dismissed Wellington as a mere ‘sepoy general’ (a reference to his service in India), something which always rankled with Wellington. He snobbishly regarded Napoleon as ‘not a gentleman’ and almost always spelled his name ‘Buonaparte’ rather than ‘Bonaparte’, to emphasise his non-French origins. Napoleon’s great skill, which Wellington admired, was in moving vast armies about very quickly. But for him, war was all about grand strategy and he lacked Wellington’s experience as an infantry commander in the field. Where Napoleon’s approach was dashing and surprising, Wellington was naturally more cautious (and perhaps more careful of the lives of his men). He was brilliant at defence, as in the Lines of Torres Vegas and again at Waterloo, where he used his oft-employed tactic of concealing his troops behind a slope. He was also careful to secure supply lines, something Napoleon failed to do in Russia. Both men were ruthless, with the difference that Napoleon wanted to be another Alexander, whereas Wellington genuinely hated war.
By the time of Waterloo Wellington, unlike Napoleon, had won all his battles. British troops were a minority in the Allied army but well trained, accurate marksmen and said to be more frightened of their NCOs than of the enemy. The Dutch and Flemish troops did themselves no credit but the battle could not have been won without Blücher’s Prussians. Wellington praised Blücher in his Waterloo despatch but never truly gave him enough credit. Napoleon’s plan was always for the big set-piece battle, in which the French would advance in a column. The British practice, as is well known, was the double line of infantrymen firing alternately and the forming of squares to repel cavalry. At Waterloo, Napoleon did not act as swiftly as usual and later blamed his own commander for failing to defeat Blücher completely at Ligny. Each side exaggerated the number of opposing troops.
After Waterloo, the Allies had to decide what to do about Napoleon. Blücher was all for executing him but Wellington opposed this strongly. He also prevented the destruction of monuments to Napoleon in Paris, another thing the Prussians were keen to do. Roberts says that Napoleon’s nemesis was not Wellington but his own decision to invade Russia. That’s not how Napoleon saw it. He had no idea that Wellington had saved his life and blamed him, quite wrongly, for sending him to St Helena, cet affreux rocher. While in exile, he spent his time going over and over the battle of Waterloo (and his listeners seem to have taken down every word eagerly). Everyone was to be blamed except himself and his former praise of Wellington turned to hatred. Wellington’s generalship was criticised; if he’d done the ‘correct’ things Napoleon suggested, he might have lost. Napoleon became so obsessed with his perceived wrongs and so petty-minded that in his will he left a sum of money to a man who had tried to assassinate Wellington.
What of ‘old nosey’, the Duke himself? The Victorians liked to portray him as a modest and self-effacing hero, typically English, but Roberts says he was ‘vain about his lack of vanity’. When you think of the priceless quantities of Napoleana (is there such a word?) at Apsley House (No.1 London, as it used to be called, rather wonderfully) and his country house at Stratfield Saye (gifts and items he bought himself), what are they but spoils of war, the sign of a conquering hero? He continued to praise Napoleon as a soldier while despising him as a man and as he grew older, some of his Waterloo stories became exaggerated.
Military historians have discussed for years and no doubt will continue for many more examining every detail of the campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars. Very interesting for them, I’m sure, but does it really matter? Napoleon was defeated, the Whigs in England discomfited, the map of Europe redrawn again, Britain, as Sellars and Yeatman would have it, Top Nation and France, instead of settling to peaceful times under the Bourbon restoration, spent the rest of the century in a state of almost continuous turmoil. In fact, everything was well set up for the First World War.
After reading this and other books on the subject, I find that although Napoleon is more important historically and was a kind of force of nature, Wellington is actually more interesting psychologically. Just my opinion.
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Date: 2023-05-03 08:39 am (UTC)no subject
Date: 2023-05-03 08:46 am (UTC)