The book is described as revisionist (it was written before Roberts’ biography of Napoleon, which I wrote rather a lot about early in 2021). Roberts says that most historians have stated that while Napoleon underrated Wellington before Waterloo, Wellington regarded Napoleon as a military genius. ‘It is these two myths that the present work sets out to dispel, for the truth is far less straightforward and much more interesting.’ ‘We shall see’ that by the time of Waterloo, each general rated the other highly. ‘This is not a joint biography, but rather a study in beliefs and rivalry, propaganda and rancour.’
I see little point in comparisons between their lives such as that they were born in the same year and each had the same number of brothers and sisters. So wot? More to the point is that for each man, Waterloo was the defining moment of their lives and since Wellington outlived Napoleon by many years, he had longer to put his side of the story. They were certainly not equals in terms of power. Once Napoleon had made himself Emperor, he was able to conscript men into la grande armée, virtually mobilising the whole of France. In contrast, Wellington was merely the commander of forces in the Peninsular War and was always answerable to Parliament, where he had many pro-Napoleon enemies among the Whigs. Napoleon claimed that Wellington would be forced to vacate the Peninsula and be rescued by the Royal Navy but this never happened; Napoleon seems not to have appreciated the ‘ulcer’ that the campaign had become and blamed his own generals rather than Wellington’s tactics for the French failure to drive out the British and defeat the Spanish guerrillas. He never went there himself, which could have made all the difference: Wellington said that Napoleon’s presence was ‘worth 40,000 men’.
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I see little point in comparisons between their lives such as that they were born in the same year and each had the same number of brothers and sisters. So wot? More to the point is that for each man, Waterloo was the defining moment of their lives and since Wellington outlived Napoleon by many years, he had longer to put his side of the story. They were certainly not equals in terms of power. Once Napoleon had made himself Emperor, he was able to conscript men into la grande armée, virtually mobilising the whole of France. In contrast, Wellington was merely the commander of forces in the Peninsular War and was always answerable to Parliament, where he had many pro-Napoleon enemies among the Whigs. Napoleon claimed that Wellington would be forced to vacate the Peninsula and be rescued by the Royal Navy but this never happened; Napoleon seems not to have appreciated the ‘ulcer’ that the campaign had become and blamed his own generals rather than Wellington’s tactics for the French failure to drive out the British and defeat the Spanish guerrillas. He never went there himself, which could have made all the difference: Wellington said that Napoleon’s presence was ‘worth 40,000 men’.
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